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Abstract 
We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they 
repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers 
differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use 
of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation 
increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. 
Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection 
and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are 
more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized 
punishment and also personal punishment when available. 
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1 Introduction 
Cooperation—acting for the joint benefit of a group—is a key issue in the social and behavioral 
sciences and has been extensively studied by experimental economists. Achieving cooperation is 
especially challenging when individuals cannot develop personal ties and interact as “strangers.” 
Two aspects of cooperation in groups of strangers are still relatively unexplored in experiments. 
First, whether results that emerge from studies based on a typical population of undergraduate 
students can be generalized to non-standard subject pools characterized by a wider array of life 
and work experiences. Second, if and how adding a personal punishment opportunity to a 
standard social dilemma affects the strategies adopted at the individual level. 
We address these aspects related to methodological issues and to substantive issues by 
carrying out a study of cooperation when the task is repeated indefinitely and subjects could not 
rely on reputation. The patterns of behavior of college students are compared to those of white-
collar workers in treatments with and without a personal punishment opportunity. The 
benchmark subject pool in the experiment consisted of undergraduate students from various 
disciplines at Purdue University, a large U.S. university. The non-standard subject pool 
comprised clerical workers employed as staff throughout Purdue University. These workers were 
mostly long-time local residents, and exhibited a wide variation in age and educational 
backgrounds.  
In the experiment pairs of subjects played a prisoner’s dilemma either with or without the 
opportunity to engage in personal punishment. They interacted for an indefinite number of 
periods as strangers: subjects neither could identify the person they were matched with nor see 
their history of play. According to folk theorem-type results, this setting admits multiple 
equilibria including one with 100% cooperation (Kandori, 1992, Ellison, 1994). Indefinite 
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repetition helps to overcome the short-run temptation to cheat others if players adopt a norm of 
behavior based on the threat of relentless decentralized punishment, i.e., if they permanently 
cease to cooperate after seeing just one defection, i.e., grim trigger strategy. Here, personal 
punishment is theoretically neither necessary nor sufficient to sustain cooperation. Evidence 
from previous studies indicates that cooperation levels are low when subjects do not know each 
other and cannot build reputations (e.g., Ostrom, 2010) and increase substantially when there are 
personal punishment opportunities (e.g., Ostrom, et al. 1992, Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). 
Our design closely reflects the decentralized trading environment in Kandori (1992) and 
Ellison (1994). This generates theoretical predictions that serve as a reference in the 
interpretation of the empirical findings. In the paper, we assess (i) the strategies adopted by 
individuals in each subject pool, (ii) how students and workers differ in their ability to achieve 
cooperation, given that many cooperation rates are supported in equilibrium, and (iii) how the 
opportunity to also inflict a personal punishment affects individual strategies. 
The design is as follows. Each participant played a supergame of indefinite duration within a 
group of four subjects. In every period, the group was randomly partitioned into two pairs of 
subjects and every pair played a prisoner’s dilemma (PD). The PD is the standard platform in the 
literature for studies about cooperation. The interaction was anonymous and subjects could only 
observe actions and outcomes in their own pair. Hence, though each group interacted repeatedly, 
this design made it impossible for a single participant to build a reputation. This excludes 
reputation-based strategies as an explanation for cooperation, and brings to the forefront 
strategies that do not discriminate individuals based on their identity. As an additional advantage, 
this stranger design facilitates the identification of strategies because it exposes participants to a 
variety of counterparts. 
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In the experiment we also introduce the possibility to adopt personal punishment. This 
amounts to add a costly opportunity to immediately respond to a counterpart's action by lowering 
her payoff. Cooperators and defectors alike could be punished. We are especially interested in 
studying if and how subjects use personal punishment to complement or to substitute for 
informal sanctioning schemes that rely on future defections. 
In previous work (Camera, Casari, and Bigoni, 2011) we questioned the empirical validity of 
the theoretical notion that play is homogeneous and that subjects implicitly coordinate on full 
cooperation when such equilibrium is available. That study revealed that only the behavior of 
one out of four subjects is consistent with the use of the grim trigger strategy. It also revealed 
that as subjects gained experience with the game, they kept experimenting with different 
strategies, and managed neither to achieve full cooperation nor to coordinate on cooperative 
strategies. 
This paper moves forward the study of equilibrium selection and individual strategy adoption 
in two directions. First, it explicitly compares aggregate and individual behavior of two diverse 
subject-pools. Second, it extends the analysis of strategies from the case where subjects can only 
resort to decentralized punishment, to a design in which they also have the opportunity to engage 
in personal punishment. We report substantial differences between subject pools both in 
aggregate and individual behavior and both in the design with and without the personal 
punishment opportunity. Students exhibit higher levels of aggregate cooperation than workers. 
Students are also less likely than workers to adopt unconditional strategies and more likely to 
select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more inclined than workers to 
sanction defections through decentralized punishment and personal punishment, when available. 
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2 Related experimental literature 
Our study is related to the experimental literature about differences in behavior and in strategies 
of subjects with different socio-demographic characteristics. One methodological question that is 
still open in this literature is whether results from a standard undergraduate population generalize 
to other populations, which is related to the external validity of experimental results (Harrison 
and List, 2004). There are only a few published studies on games of trust and cooperation, which 
compare students to non-student samples; the main message is that students are less cooperative 
and that age tends to be negatively correlated with cooperation.  
The literature on public good games indicates that students contribute on average less than 
non-students. Support for this result comes from several studies involving non-student subject 
(e.g., Carpenter and Seki, 2006, Egas and Riedl, 2008). See also Burks et al. (2009), for a one 
shot prisoners’ dilemma game with student and non-student population, Students tend to 
cooperate less than non-students also in trust and investment games;  they exhibit a less trusting 
and trustworthy behavior (e.g., Fehr and List 2004, Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007). More in 
general, there is evidence that age is positively related to trust and trustworthiness (e.g., Gaechter 
et al., 2004, Sutter and Kocher, 2007, Hannan et al., 2002). 
A growing number of experimental studies collect empirical evidence about strategies 
adoption in indefinitely repeated social dilemmas. Most of these studies involve a short time 
horizon and a subject pool of only undergraduate students (e.g., Kurzban and Houser, 2005, 
Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006, Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2009, Fudenberg et al., 2010, Davis et 
al., 2011). In contrast, our design is based on a game with a longer horizon with also workers’ 
participants. It complements and extends the works in Camera and Casari (2009), on the impact 
of information on cooperation, and in Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2011), on individual strategy 
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adoption in a standard subject pool. The main elements of novelty relative to the above two 
studies are as follows. First, here we study how the availability of peer punishment affects 
strategy adoption; peer punishment is known to strongly affect aggregate behavior, although not 
much is known about how it affects individual strategies. Second, we investigate whether there 
are any subject-pool specificities in strategy adoption and realized cooperation levels. 
The experimental literature on the effects of costly personal punishment on cooperation has 
mostly focused on one-shot and finitely repeated social dilemmas. Subjects display a tendency to 
engage in costly personal punishment of others, especially defectors. Though this behavior is 
inconsistent with personal income maximization, it has been shown to be remarkably robust 
(e.g., Ostrom et al, 1992, Casari and Luini, 2009). We examine whether and how this behavioral 
trait impacts the strategies adopted to sustain cooperation in an indefinitely repeated game, where 
subjects can also use a decentralized punishment scheme to police defections. 
 
3 Experimental design 
The experiment consists of four treatments, characterized by a different combination of two 
treatment variables: the availability of a personal punishment option (no punishment, NP, or 
personal punishment, PP) and the nature of the subject pool (students or workers). Continuation 
probability, stage game parameters, matching protocols, and private monitoring were kept 
constant. The NP treatment is a baseline environment designed to study strategy selection in an 
indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma among strangers, where individual reputation formation 
is impossible. In an additional treatment (PP treatment), we also study how behavior is 
influenced by the availability of punishment institutions, i.e., when subjects have the option to 
 7 
use personal punishment.1
Each participant played a supergame within a group of four persons who interacted privately and 
anonymously. Subjects were randomly matched in pairs in each period. Because we will employ 
non-cooperative equilibrium theory to develop theoretical predictions, we refer to a subject’s 
counterpart in a pair as the “opponent.” The interaction was private because subjects observed 
only outcomes in their pair. The interaction was anonymous because subjects could not observe 
identities, thus reputation building was impossible.  
 To investigate whether realized outcomes and individual strategies 
adopted vary across different subject pools, we ran experiments with undergraduates and white 
collar workers. Below we describe stage game, continuation probability and matching protocols, 
which were identical across treatments. 
 The stage game was the prisoners’ dilemma described in Table 1. In the experiment, 
subjects could choose between C (=Cooperate) and D (=Defect). The parameters of the 
experiment were calibrated to promote some cooperative choices, which is necessary to uncover 
the strategies that participants adopt to support cooperative outcomes.2
Player 1 
   
Player 2 
Cooperate 
 
Defect 
 
Cooperate 25, 25 5, 30 
Defect 30, 5 10, 10 
 
Table 1: The stage game 
Notes to Table 1: the labels in the instructions were Y for Cooperate and Z for Defect 
A supergame (or cycle as in the instructions) consisted of an indefinite interaction among 
subjects achieved by a random continuation rule; see Roth and Murninghan (1978) or Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1994). To implement this rule, at the end of each period the program drew a 
                                                 
1 These two treatments respectively correspond to the Private Monitoring and Private Monitoring with Personal 
Punishment treatments in Camera and Casari (2009). 
2 The parameterization in Table 1 was selected as it scores high on the indexes proposed by Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965) and Roth and Murnighan (1978) that correlate with the level of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma in a partner protocol.  
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random integer between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution. The cycle continued with a 
draw of 95 or below. Hence, in each period a cycle continues with a constant probability 
δ=0.95. For a risk-neutral subject δ represents the discount factor. In each period, the cycle was 
expected to continue for 19 additional periods. All session participants observed the same 
random draw, which means that cycles terminated simultaneously for all economies. 
Each experimental session comprised twenty subjects and five cycles. We built twenty-five 
economies in each session by creating five groups of four subjects in each of the five cycles. 
Matching across cycles followed a perfect stranger protocol: in each cycle each group included 
only subjects who had neither been part of the same group in previous cycles nor were part of the 
same group in future cycles. Subjects were informed that no two participants would ever interact 
together for more than one cycle. With this matching protocol across cycles, we can consider 
each subject as having five distinct “lives” in a session. 
In each cycle, participants in every four-subject group interacted in pairs as follows. At the 
beginning of each period of the cycle, the group was randomly divided into two pairs. Each 
subject had one third probability of meeting any other participant in each period. For the entire 
cycle a subject interacted exclusively with the members of her group. In each group, subjects 
could neither observe identities of their opponents, nor communicate with each other, nor 
observe histories of others. As a consequence, subjects did not share a common history.3
The PP treatment introduced the possibility of personal punishment in the baseline design. 
Subjects could lower the opponent’s earnings at a cost. This was done by adding a second stage 
to the game played in each round. The first stage was the prisoners’ dilemma in Table 1. After 
  
                                                 
3 This experimental design expands the scope of the analysis relative to designs based on two-person groups. First, 
subjects face a wider variety of behavior, which facilitates the empirical identification of strategies. Second, we can 
investigate strategies that are not based on reputation, since we can control anonymity. Third, it allows investigation 
of how subjects coordinate on outcomes and strategies, which is more challenging than in two-member groups.  
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the outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma was observed, both subjects in the pair had the 
opportunity to pay 5 points to reduce the opponent's earnings by 10 points. These decisions were 
simultaneous. No one could observe outcomes or actions outside a pair, including personal 
punishment. 
The second treatment variable is the subject pool. The experiment involved two distinct 
groups of subjects: 80 undergraduate students from various disciplines at Purdue University and 
80 clerical workers employed as staff throughout Purdue University. Undergraduates have a 
strong international component, while clerical workers are mostly long-time state residents, who 
exhibit a wide variation in age and educational background. Table 2 reports a summary of the 
main demographic characteristics of the two subject pools. 
We ran two sessions per treatment. Each session had 20 participants and 5 cycles. The 80 
student subjects were recruited through e-mail and in-class-announcements. The 80 worker 
subjects were recruited through e-mails targeted to administrative and technical staff across the 
West Lafayette campus. Each subject participated in only one session. Some students had 
previously participated in other types of economics experiments, while none of the workers had. 
Sessions were run in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Lab at Purdue University. No 
eye contact was possible among subjects. Instructions were read aloud with copies on all desks. 
A copy of the instructions is in Appendix B. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Average earnings were $18 excluding show-up fees. A session lasted on 
average 84 periods for a running time of about 2 hours, including instruction reading and a quiz.4
                                                 
4 Sessions took place on the following dates for NP: 21.4.05 (71) and 7.9.05 (104) with undergraduates, 29.11.05 
(80) and 06.12.05 (50) with clerical workers; for PP: 28.04.05 (139) and 06.09.05 (99) with undergraduates, 8.12.05 
(56) and 13.07.06 (77) with clerical workers. In parenthesis we report the total number of periods for the session. 
Show-up fees are as follows: students received $5 ($0 on 06.09.05); clerical workers received $5 in the PP and $10 
in the NP treatments. Data of the first two sessions in treatments NP and PP are also analyzed in Camera and Casari 
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Students (N=80)  Workers (N=80) 
 Average Missing   Average Missing  
Male 53.8% 0  63.6% 3 
Age 21.2 10  37.4 14 
Married 5.0% 40  50.6% 3 
With children 2.5% 40  53.3% 5 
Gross family income > $50,000 65.2% 57  43.5% 18 
Home owner 5.0% 40  64.0% 5 
Education: college or higher  10.0% 40  57.1% 3 
Work experience (years)  2 0  13.5 0 
Foreign born 18.9% 43  7.7% 2 
Table 2. Demographic characteristics 
Notes to Table 2: Data are self reported by subject in the questionnaire. Some observations are missing because 
subjects either did not respond, or had a different version of the questionnaire. 
 
4 Theoretical considerations  
Here we offer theoretical equilibrium considerations, based on the Folk theorem-type results 
proved in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) for random matching economies.5
Consider identical players, self-regarding and risk-neutral. The stage game is a prisoner’s 
dilemma where total surplus in the group is maximized when everyone chooses C (=efficient 
outcome) and hence earns c=25 and minimized when everyone selects D (=inefficient outcome) 
and earns d=10. The Nash equilibrium is unique and corresponds to the inefficient outcome. 
 
Indefinite repetition of the stage game with random participants supports a large set of 
sequential equilibrium outcomes. We discuss two equilibria. First, the strategy “always defect” is 
always a sequential equilibrium because D is a best response to play of D by any randomly 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2009), which however does not analyze individual strategies. Data of all sessions of the NP treatment are also 
analyzed in Camera, Casari and Bigoni (2011).  
5 Details on derivations are in the Appendix to Camera and Casari (2009). 
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chosen opponent. In this inefficient outcome everyone earns d in each period, hence earns payoff 
d/(1−δ). Second, if δ is sufficiently high, then 100% cooperation can be sustained in each period 
as a sequential equilibrium (Kandori 1992, Ellison 1994). In this efficient outcome every player 
earns payoff c/(1−δ). More precisely, let δ*∈(0,1) be the unique value of δ that satisfies 
032(2 =c )( hd )chδ+d )( hδ −−−−− . 
Here h=30 is the payoff when the player defects while the opponent cooperates. If δ ≥ δ*, then 
the efficient outcome is a sequential equilibrium; this sufficient condition is satisfied in all 
experimental treatments because δ=0.95>δ*=0.443. 
To see how players can support the efficient outcome, consider a situation in which all 
players adopt the grim trigger strategy. This social norm is a rule of behavior that identifies 
desirable play and a decentralized punishment scheme to be implemented if a departure from 
desirable play is ever observed. Put simply, each player starts cooperating and keeps cooperating, 
unless someone defects; in that case the player switches to a punishment phase consisting of 
“always defect.” This triggers a contagious, indiscriminate and relentless punishment process. 
Although people may not ordinarily follow a grim trigger strategy in practice, theorists employ it 
widely when tracing the cooperation frontier in repeated games. Because defection is an 
absorbing state, such decentralized punishment threat ensures that no-one deviates in equilibrium 
as long as players sufficiently value future payoffs. This requires a sufficiently large discount 
factor δ. In economies of four players, the absorbing state can be reached very quickly, hence δ* 
is low. 
Several remarks are in order. First, due to private monitoring, T-periods punishment 
strategies cannot support the efficient outcome as an equilibrium; see Ellison (1994). Second, 
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that same paper indicates that the efficient outcome could be sustained in our experiment also by 
adopting contagious punishment strategies that exploit the availability of a public randomization 
device. This is so because in every period all session participants observed the same random 
integer number, which could have served as a public randomization device. Third, cooperation is 
risk-dominant in our design, in the following sense. Compare the strategy “always defect” to 
“grim trigger.” Grim trigger is risk-dominant if a player is at least indifferent to selecting it, 
given that everyone else is believed to select each of the two strategies with equal probability. 
Indifference requires δ= 0.763. 
Finally—and most importantly—the use of personal punishment is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome as an equilibrium in our private-monitoring economies. 
The personal punishment opportunity gives players the (costly) option to lower their opponents’ 
earnings, after observing the outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma. In one-shot interactions, using 
personal punishment is a dominated action because it is costly for the punisher. Given indefinite 
repetition, personal punishment is not theoretically necessary for two reasons. First, players can 
adopt the social norm based on grim trigger to sustain the efficient outcome. Second, use of 
personal punishment does not allow players to trigger a faster contagious process of defection, 
because actions cannot be observed outside a match. On the other hand, the use of personal 
punishment alone is not theoretically sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome because it is not 
credible, though it could be used in combination with the threat of switching to harsher 
punishments (e.g., a penal code-type of strategy that presumes a switch to “always defect” if a 
defector is not sanctioned with personal punishment). In short, standard theoretical arguments 
suggest that personal punishment is an irrelevant institution to sustain cooperation. 
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5 Estimation procedure for individual strategies 
This section describes the methodology adopted for the empirical identification of the strategies 
employed by individuals in the experiment. The unit of observation is the sequence of all choices 
of a subject in a cycle (=an individual); we may also refer to such a sequence as one observation. 
Hence, each subject in the experiment contributed five observations to the dataset. 
In this repeated game there are infinitely many strategies. The data analysis in this paper 
focuses on twelve strategies, some of which are consistent with equilibrium behavior while 
others are not (Table 3). Consider that any type of behavior observed in the experiment can be 
described by a sufficiently complex strategy. We used the following approach to select the 
twelve strategies. First, we have considered strategies that rely neither on personal punishment 
nor on personal punishment histories. As noted earlier, personal punishment is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome, hence we study the use of personal punishment 
separately from the behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma. Second, we have included the two 
unconditional strategies “always defect” and “always cooperate,” as well as ten conditional 
strategies of cooperation for which there is already some empirical support (Dal Bó and 
Fréchette, 2011, Fudenberg et al., 2011, Camera, Casari and Bigoni, 2011). The ten conditional 
strategies allow us to gauge the complexity of subjects’ behavior: they include strategies that 
condition on short as well as on longer histories of play. We include “tit-for-tat” and “grim 
trigger” and eight longer-memory versions of such strategies that exhibit either a longer fuse to 
triggering the punishment phase, or a longer punishment phase. 
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Strategy 
 
Description 
 
Unconditional  
Always cooperate Always choose C (=cooperate) 
Always defect Always choose D (=defect) 
Unforgiving  
Grim trigger Cooperate until an opponent defects, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim2-A Cooperate until 2 opponents defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim2-B Cooperate until 2 opponents consecutively defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim3-A Cooperate until 3 opponents defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Grim3-B Cooperate until 3 opponents consecutively defect, and then switch to “always defect.” 
Forgiving  
Tit for Tat (TFT) Cooperate unless the previous opponent defected. 
Two-tits-for-tat (2TFT) Cooperate unless an opponent defected in any of the last 2 rounds (play D for two consecutive rounds after a defection is observed) 
Tit-for-two-tats (TF2T) Cooperate unless the opponents defected in each of the last 2 rounds. 
Three-tits-for-tat (3TFT) Cooperate unless an opponent defected in any of the last 3 rounds (play D for three consecutive rounds after a defection is observed) 
Tit-for-three-tats (TF3T) Cooperate unless the opponents defected in each of the last 3 rounds. 
Table 3. Strategies considered 
It is convenient to group the strategies listed in Table 3 into three distinct strategy sets. The 
first set includes strategies in which actions are unconditional on histories and prescribe the 
indefinite repetition of the same action in the prisoner’s dilemma: “always cooperate” and 
“always defect.” The remaining ten conditional strategies prescribe cooperation in the initial 
period. We divide them into two sets. One includes unforgiving strategies, in which one or more 
observed defections triggers a switch to a permanent punishment phase; it includes “grim 
trigger” and more lenient versions of such strategy in which the switch to the punishment phase 
is triggered only if more than one defection is observed (consecutively and not). The last strategy 
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set includes forgiving strategies, in which observed defections trigger a temporary punishment 
phase. It includes “tit for tat” and more lenient or less forgiving variants that have either a delay 
in triggering to the punishment phase or have a longer punishment phase. While “Always 
Defect” and “Grim Trigger” are equilibrium strategies, other strategies considered, such as 
“Always cooperate,” are clearly not. 
We estimate the importance of each candidate strategy with a maximum likelihood approach, 
as in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2011). The estimation employs data 
from all cycles and presumes that (i) all subjects face the same probability distribution of 
adopting in a cycle one of the 12 strategies considered, (ii) subjects may change strategy from 
cycle to cycle (but not within a cycle), and (iii) subjects may make errors in implementing 
actions, i.e., with some probability (time-invariant, and identical across subjects) a subject may 
choose an action that is not recommended by the strategy adopted.6
In the PP treatment subjects could use personal punishment to immediately respond to an 
opponent’s action. We are especially interested in studying if and how subjects use personal 
punishment to complement or to substitute for sanctions based on defection. To this end, we 
have considered only strategies that condition on the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma in the 
first stage of the game, but do not condition on histories of play form previous periods. For 
simplicity, we have included only strategies that prescribe personal punishment only if someone 
defected.
 
7
                                                 
6 The estimation was executed adapting the code included in the supplementary material of Dal Bó and Fréchette 
(2011). The details of the estimation procedure are reported in Appendix A. 
 Hence, we end up considering eight “punishment strategies” because personal 
punishment might be selected only in three possible outcomes of the prisoner’s dilemma: CD, 
7 This is because in the PP treatment, individuals used personal punishment in less than 0.5% of the periods where 
CC was the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
 16 
DC, and DD. The prevalence of each of these eight punishment strategies is estimated using the 
aforementioned maximum likelihood approach. 
 
6 Results 
This section presents a comparison of outcomes and strategies for different subject pools. The 
findings are organized into five main results. The first result concerns the differences in overall 
cooperation rates across treatments. The second illustrates the strategies adopted by the two 
subject pools in the treatments without personal punishment. The third and the fourth results 
describe students and workers’ strategies in the treatments with personal punishment. Finally, the 
fifth result discusses subject-pool differences in the use of personal punishment. 
 
Result 1. Average cooperation rates are higher among students than workers in all treatments. 
Figure 1 and Table 4 provide support for Result 1. In the NP treatment the cooperation rate in all 
periods is 16.1 percentage points higher for students than for workers (Table 4, column 1; the 
difference is significant at the 5% level).8
A similar finding emerges from the PP treatment. Students’ cooperation rate is 11.1 
percentage points higher than workers’ in all periods, and 11 percentage points when considering 
only the first period of each cycle. Differences are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, 
 This difference is confirmed by data from the first 
period of each cycle, which is 10.5 percentage points higher for students than for workers (Table 
4, column 2; the difference is not significant). 
                                                 
8 For cycle k=1,..,K of a session, define the action of subject j=1,.., J in period t=1,..,Tk as aitk=0,1, where 1 is 
cooperation. The cooperation rate of subject j is ∑ ∑∑= ==
K
k
K
k
kT
t
k
tjj Ta=c
k
1 11
 between 0 and 1 (reported in %), 
and across subjects is ∑ =
J
j j Jc=c 1 . So, if cycles have different length Tk, then they receive different weight in the 
measure c of average cooperation. 
 17 
respectively (Table 4, column 2). 
 
Figure 1. Cooperation rates 
Notes to Figure 1: NP= treatment without personal punishment; PP=treatment with personal punishment. 
Cooperation rates are calculated across all periods of all cycles, first by dividing the number of periods of all five 
cycles in which a subject cooperated by the total number of periods played, then taking the average across subjects. 
This implies that the weight of each cycle on the cooperation rate in a session is proportional to its length, but the 
sessions in the treatment are equally weighted.  
 
 All periods Periods 1 
 Marginal effect 
(s.e.) 
Marginal effect 
(s.e.) 
PP treatment 0.142** 
(0.055) 
0.127 
(0.102) 
Worker × NP treatment -0.164** 
(0.053) 
-0.092 
(0.094) 
Worker × PP treatment -0.125** 
(0.041) 
-0.127*** 
(0.047) 
Constant 0.570*** 
(0.046) 
--- 
   
Observations 800 800 
R-squared 0.091 --- 
Pseudo-R squared --- 0.027 
Table 4. Initial and average cooperation rates 
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Notes to Table 4: The first column reports the marginal effects obtained by a logit regression where the dependent 
variable is the binary decision to cooperate (=1) or defect (=0) in period 1 of each cycle. The second column reports 
the estimated coefficients from an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the average cooperation rate 
for each individual (i.e., for each subject in a cycle). In this second regression, each observation is weighted for the 
length of the cycle it belongs to, so cycles with longer length have more weight. In both regressions, we include 
three independent variables, which capture treatment effects. The first regressor is a dummy that takes value 1 in the 
treatment with Personal Punishment and zero otherwise. The second and third regressors interact the dummy 
“worker” (taking value 1 for subjects who are not undergraduate students, zero otherwise) with the two dummies for 
the NP and PP treatment. These last two regressors capture the difference in average cooperation rates between 
students and workers, in the distinct cases with and without personal punishment. In parentheses we report standard 
errors robust for clustering at the session level: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Result 2. In the treatment without personal punishment, students and workers differ in their 
strategy adoption. Workers select “always defect” more frequently than students, and select 
“forgiving” strategies less frequently.  
Support for Result 2 comes from Table 5, which reports the maximum likelihood estimates 
of the population proportions for each of the 12 strategies considered. 
 Students  Workers 
Strategy Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
Unconditional        
Always cooperate 0.177 *** 0.039  0.164 *** 0.024 
Always Defect 0.238 *** 0.060  0.366 *** 0.051 
Unforgiving        
Grim trigger 0.061 ** 0.025  0.101 * 0.052 
Grim2-A 0.021 * 0.012  0.088 *** 0.031 
Grim2-B 0.060 ** 0.024  0.000  0.015 
Grim3-A 0.049 *** 0.018  0.000  0.000 
Grim3-B 0.099 *** 0.023  0.083 ** 0.033 
Forgiving        
Tit for Tat 0.078 *** 0.017  0.054  0.034 
2TFT 0.034 *** 0.010  0.000  0.013 
TF2T 0.057 ** 0.025  0.076 * 0.046 
3TFT 0.026  0.018  0.030  0.024 
TF3T 0.101 *   0.037 *  
gamma 0.438 *** 0.014   0.619 *** 0.057 
Log-likelihood 1319.767    1359.284   
N 200       200     
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of strategy adoption (NP treatment) 
The estimated shares of “always defect” are 23.8% for students and 36.6% for workers; the 
shares of “forgiving” strategies are 29.6% for students and 19.7% for workers. 
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Table 5 also reports the estimate for the parameter γ, which controls the variance of the 
distribution of errors in implementing the action prescribed by the strategy selected. This 
variance is higher among workers than students, which suggests that it is more difficult to 
capture workers’ behavior through the set of strategies considered. 
 
Result 3: In the treatment with personal punishment, students cooperate more than in the 
treatment without. When personal punishment is available, students adopt conditionally 
cooperative strategies more frequently and “always defect” less frequently. 
The cooperation rate in periods 1 for students significantly increases from 73.5 in the NP 
treatment to 84.5 in the PP treatment (Figure 1, Table 4), as already noted in Camera and Casari 
(2009). The maximum likelihood estimation of strategies helps understanding why this is so, as it 
describes a substantial change in the strategies adopted. Recall that the strategies estimated in 
Table 5 explicitly focus on patterns of behavior in the prisoners’ dilemma and do not condition 
on personal punishment; the use of personal punishment is analyzed later. Students are less likely 
to adopt unconditional strategies when personal punishment is available; the estimated share of 
“always cooperate” drops a few points, while the estimated share of “always defect” dramatically 
drops from 23.8% to 7.8% (see Table 5 vs. Table 6). The data show a substantial increase both in 
the share of “unforgiving” strategies (from 29% to 38.4%) and in the share of “forgiving” 
strategies (from 29.6% to 41.8%). The availability of personal punishment seems to motivate 
students to make an attempt at coordinating on cooperation. This is done by adopting strategies 
that start with cooperation, and prescribe a switch to a punishment phase only after one or more 
defections are observed.  
Interestingly, the increase in cooperation rates is associated with the adoption of conditional 
 20 
rather than unconditional cooperative strategies. One could have conjectured that what sustained 
high cooperation in the PP treatment was the “always cooperate” strategy together with the use 
of personal punishment targeted to defectors. The estimation of individual strategies adopted by 
students provides no support for this conjecture. As shown below, the data exhibit different 
patterns for workers. 
 Students  Workers 
strategy Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
Unconditional        
Always cooperate 0.120 *** 0.028  0.264 *** 0.045 
Always defect 0.078 *** 0.013  0.254 *** 0.024 
Unforgiving        
Grim trigger 0.078 *** 0.025  0.054 *** 0.015 
Grim2-A 0.065 ** 0.029  0.106 *** 0.022 
Grim2-B 0.128 *** 0.049  0.000  0.002 
Grim3-A 0.016 * 0.010  0.000  0.000 
Grim3-B 0.097 *** 0.027  0.122 *** 0.035 
Forgiving        
Tit for Tat 0.120 *** 0.022  0.019  0.018 
2TFT 0.000  0.001  0.060 *** 0.022 
TF2T 0.185 *** 0.035  0.023  0.014 
3TFT 0.024  0.022  0.000  0.005 
TF3T 0.089 ***   0.099 ***  
gamma 0.420 *** 0.026   0.564 *** 0.028 
Log-likelihood 1504.425    1288.470   
N 200       200     
Table 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimation of strategy adoption (PP treatment).  
 
Result 4: In the treatment with personal punishment, workers cooperate more than in the 
treatment without. When personal punishment is available, workers follow “always cooperate” 
more frequently and “always defect” less frequently. 
The cooperation rate in period 1 for workers increases from 63% in the NP treatment to 73.5% in 
the PP treatment (Figure 1). The impact on overall cooperation rates of the availability of 
personal punishment is similar across subject pools. However, the impact on strategy adoption is 
qualitatively different. 
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Workers are less likely to adopt “always defect” and more likely to adopt “always cooperate” 
when personal punishment is available (see Table 5 vs. Table 6). The estimated shares drop from 
36.6% to 25.4% for “always defect” and increase from 16.4% to 26.4% for “always cooperate.” 
The changes are approximately of the same magnitude, and minimal variations appear for 
“Forgiving” and “Unforgiving” strategies. Comparing Tables 5 and 6 suggests that, in the case of 
workers, the availability of personal punishment options raises by about 10 percentage points the 
prevalence of “always cooperate” while decreasing the prevalence of “always defect” by the 
same amount. One interpretation is that workers substituted the cooperative for the 
uncooperative unconditional strategy.  
 
Result 5: Workers used personal punishment less frequently than students. 
The support for Result 5 is in Table 7, which reports results for a maximum likelihood estimation 
of the prevalence of the eight personal punishment strategies considered, separated by subject 
pool. In the experiment, the strategy that prescribes to never use personal punishment (“never 
punish”) has a 62.8% share among workers and 44.1% among students. In both subject pools 
personal punishment is used basically only to sanction a defection of the opponent. The strategy 
that prescribes personal punishment only when the subject cooperated and the opponent defected 
(“punish cheaters”), is more widely adopted among students than workers (38.7% among 
students vs. 21.9% among workers). The share of students and workers who punish a defector 
when they have also defected is, instead, identical (“punish all defections”). 
Given our previous Results 3 and 4, we can interpret this finding as an indication that the 
availability of personal punishment has a different impact on the way students and workers 
police deviations from cooperation. Students use personal punishment as a tool that 
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complements decentralized punishment. Relative to the NP treatment, in the PP treatment 
students are more likely to adopt strategies that trigger a decentralized punishment phase (when a 
defection is observed) and also use personal punishment on defectors. Instead, workers are more 
likely to adopt unconditional cooperative strategies in the PP than in the NP treatment, 
sanctioning defections with personal punishment rather than with decentralized punishment. 
 Students  Workers 
Personal punishment strategy Coefficient s.e.   Coefficient s.e. 
Never punish (000) 0.441 *** 0.064  0.628 *** 0.110 
Punish cheaters (100) 0.387 *** 0.062  0.219 *** 0.079 
Punish all defections (101) 0.116 ** 0.048  0.116 *** 0.039 
Always punish (111) 0.036  N.A.  0.000  N.A. 
Other punishment strategies 
(001, 010, 011, and 110) 0.021  N.A.  0.037  N.A. 
γ 0.294 *** 0.018  0.345 *** 0.021 
Log-likelihood 748.661    646.876   
N 200      200     
Table 7. Maximum Likelihood Estimation on punishment strategies adoption 
Notes to Table 7: Punishment strategies are coded as follows: 0 means “do not punish” 1 means “punish”. The first 
digit of the strategy is the action to be taken when the subject cooperates and the opponent defects. The second 
indicates the action to be taken when the subject defects and the opponent cooperates. The third indicates the action 
to be taken when the subject defects and the opponent defects. 
 
7  Conclusions 
This paper reports results from an experiment on social dilemmas involving a pool of college 
students and one of clerical workers. It contributes to the literature on cooperation in two ways. 
First, a methodological contribution is associated to the discovery of differences in behavior 
across subject pools. Most of the existing laboratory studies on this topic have been conducted 
with college students as subjects. The data show that not all results from student subjects can be 
generalized. Workers in our experiment tended to cooperate with a lower frequency overall and 
to start defecting from the beginning of the game. In contrast, previous studies have found that 
students are on average less cooperative than other subject pools. There may be a variety of 
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possible explanations. On the one hand, clerical workers may be a peculiar sample that is 
different from other samples of adult population. Perhaps, these differences originate in a 
stronger orientation toward individual tasks that characterize clerical work. This may feed back 
in clerical workers’ ability to coordinate with others on cooperative tasks. On the other hand, 
social dilemmas with known, deterministic duration may simply induce qualitatively different 
behavior than when duration is indefinite, as in our experiment. 
A second contribution of the paper emerges from comparing individual strategy adoption in 
the prisoner’s dilemma, in treatments with and without a personal punishment opportunity. 
Workers were more likely to unconditionally cooperate in treatments with personal punishment 
than without. Instead, the introduction of personal punishment made students more likely to 
adopt a cooperative strategy based on the threat of temporary punishment, i.e., to adopt 
“forgiving” strategies. 
In the treatment with a personal punishment opportunity, there are additional remarkable 
differences between students and workers. Students no longer followed “always defect,” while 
the prevalence of this uncooperative behavior among workers, albeit lower, remained strong. In 
general, in the experiment personal punishment is either not used or it is used to sanction 
defectors. There was virtually no anti-social punishment both among students and workers, i.e., 
defectors did not punish cooperators. The one difference is that workers were overall less likely 
than students to use personal punishment. 
These findings show that, when faced with a cooperative task, dissimilar subject pools 
exhibit substantially different strategy profiles. In particular, we observe two disparities. One the 
one hand workers were less prone to adopt cooperative strategies. Even in treatments with 
personal punishment, no less than one fourth of workers started by defecting and continued 
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defecting unconditionally. On the other hand, workers were overall less inclined to follow 
strategies that sanction uncooperative behavior either with decentralized punishment or with 
personal punishment. These two findings may explain why we observed less cooperation among 
workers than students.  
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Appendix A
Strategy estimation procedure
To estimate the prevalence of each strategy in our dataset we use a standard maximum
likelihood (ML) procedure, as in Dal Bo´ and Frechette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2011).
There are two basic assumptions. First, each subject j = 1, . . . , J (where J = 40 in each of
our four treatments) adopts the same strategy k ∈ K in all periods of a cycle n = 1, . . . , 5.
Subject j may choose a different strategy in different cycles, unlike in Dal Bo´ and Frechette
(2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2011). Therefore, we denote by i ∈ I := {1, . . . , 5J} the
individual, i.e., a subject in a cycle. The individual is our unit of observation. Second,
in every period, individual i may make a mistake in choosing the action prescribed by
the strategy adopted. This mistake is distributed identically and independently across
individuals and periods.
More specifically, consider individual i in period t = 1, . . . , T i, where T i is individual-
specific because cycles have generally different durations. Let sit(k) = −1, 1 denote the
choice of individual i in period t if she follows strategy k; −1 indicates that D should be
implemented, and 1 indicates C. It is assumed that individual i chooses C if yit = 1 and
chooses D otherwise, where we define
yit :=

1 if sit(k) + γε
i
t ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
Here εit is an error term with probability density function such that the likelihood P
i(k)
that individual i adopts strategy k has a logistic distribution. The parameter γ controls
1
the variance of the error. Consequently,
1
1 + e−1/γ
is the probability that the action
implemented by an individual in any period coincides with the actions prescribed by the
strategy. Hence, the likelihood that individual i adopts strategy k is
P i(k) =
T i∏
t=1
(
1
1 + exp(−sit(k)/γ)
)yit ( 1
1 + exp(sit(k)/γ)
)1−yit
.
The function we wish to maximize is the log-likelihood
∑
i∈I
ln
(∑
k∈K
pikP
i(k)
)
. (1)
We estimate the parameter vector pi := (pik)k∈K and the variance parameter γ that maxi-
mize (??). The vector pi describes the probability distribution over the set K of strategies.
The estimated parameter pˆik ∈ pˆi, represents the proportion of individuals (or observa-
tions) that is attributed to strategy k, or, equivalently, the prevalence of each strategy in
our dataset. The estimated parameter γˆ provides a measure of the probability of mistakes.
2
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Appendix B—Not for Publication 
Instructions for the NP treatment without personal punishment 
 
Overview 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  Purdue University has provided funds for this 
research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, 
you can earn an appreciable amount of money. These earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment.  
 We ask that you not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. Please turn 
off your cell-phones. Do not use e-mail. 
During the course of this experiment, you will be called upon to make decisions in 
several periods. The experiment is divided into five sequences of periods and each sequence is 
referred to as a cycle. 
• At the beginning of a cycle, each participant in this room will be randomly 
assigned to a set.  
 
• In each set there will be four persons.  
 
• For the whole duration of a cycle, you will interact exclusively with the three 
other participants in that set and nobody else.  
 
• You will never meet again these participants in the following cycles.  
 
In each period of a cycle: 
• In each period you will be matched to one other participant selected at random 
from the set you are assigned to. We will refer to this person as “your match.” 
 
• You will not be informed of the identity of your match. Hence, you do not know 
when you have already interacted with that person in previous periods of the 
same cycle. 
 
• You and your match will interact according to the rules described in the upper 
portion of your screen. The rules will be explained in a moment. 
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• After each period you will be re-matched to a participant chosen at random from 
the set you are assigned to. There is one chance out of three that you will be 
matched with any given person in your set. 
 
 
Interaction rules 
In a period you and your match can make either of two choices, Y or Z.  The points you 
earn in a period depend upon both the choice you make and the choice made by your match in 
that period. As the payoff table on your screen (above) indicates, there are four possible 
outcomes: 
1. If both of you choose Y this period then:  you both earn 25 points. 
 
2. If you choose Y this period and your match chooses Z then:  you earn 5 points and your 
match earns 30 points. 
 
3. If you choose Z this period and your match chooses Y then: you earn 30 points and your 
match earns 5 points. 
Period 
History of choices of your 
previous matches 
You ignore the 
ID of your match 
 
Your set 
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4. If you both choose Z then:  you both earn 10 points. 
  To make your choice in each period, click the button next to either Y or Z.  You may 
change your mind at any time prior to clicking the “Submit” button by simply clicking on the 
button next to Y or Z. You are free to choose Y or Z in every period.  When you are satisfied 
with your choice, click the “Submit” button. After all persons have made their choices, the 
results of the period will appear on your screen.   
 
 
 
 
The result screen (above) will display the number of points you have earned for the 
period along with your choice and the choice of your match. The first column of the 
‘Summary of Results’ table contains your past choices. The second column concerns the choices 
of your previous matches. Notice that choices in the second column were most likely made by 
different persons in different periods. You are not given information on the choices made 
by the other two persons in your set. Please record your results for the period on your 
RECORD SHEET under the appropriate headings. 
Your results 
 
Random number 
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At this stage a ball will be drawn from an urn containing one hundred balls numbered 
from 1 to 100. Each ball is equally likely to be selected. The computer program will randomly 
draw a ball and show the number on the result screen (above). If this random number is less than 
or equal to 95, then the cycle will continue into the next period. If this number is greater than 95, 
then the cycle ends.  Therefore, after each period there is a 95% chance that there will be 
another period of interactions in the cycle and a 5% chance that the cycle will end.   
Suppose that a number less than or equal to 95 has been drawn.  Then you press the 
“Continue” button to proceed.  You will face the same decisional situation as in the previous 
period, but with a person selected at random from the set of participants you were assigned 
to. Remember that there are four participants in each set.  
 
Before making your choice, you may review all the outcomes in previous periods of the 
cycle by scrolling down the “Summary of Results” table.  The table shows your history and the 
past choices of the persons who happened to be your match in the period. You then choose either 
Y or Z.  Your choice and the choice of your match this period are recorded and added to the 
Summary of Results table in the lower portion of your screen.  You record the outcome and your 
point earnings for the period.  
  
If the number drawn is greater than 95 then the cycle ends. When a cycle ends, you will 
be notified in a new screen. There will be a total of five cycles. The rules in the following cycles 
are the same as in the first, but you will interact with different persons. More precisely, after each 
cycle, new sets of persons will be formed. This assignment does not depend on actual choices. A 
participant will never interact with a person for more than one cycle. 
  
 
Earnings 
  
The points you earned in each period are added up. For every 10 points that you earn you will 
receive 13 cents ($.13).  Therefore, the more points you earn the more money you earn. In 
addition, you will receive a $10 show-up fee. You will be paid your earnings in cash and in 
private at the end of today’s session. 
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Final Comments 
  
First, do not discuss your choices or your results with anyone at any time during the 
experiment.   
  
Second, your ID# is private.  Do not reveal it to anyone. 
  
Third, since there is a 95% chance that at the end of a period the cycle will continue, you 
can expect, on average, to interact for 20 periods in a given cycle.  However, since the stopping 
decision is made randomly, some cycles may be much longer than 20 periods and some others 
may be much shorter. 
  
Fourth, remember that after each period you will be matched randomly to someone in the 
set you were assigned to. As there are four people in the set, the probability of you being 
matched with the same person in two consecutive periods of a cycle is 1/3. You are not told the 
identity of your match. 
 
Fifth, the rules are the same in all five cycles. After a cycle, you will never meet again the 
same participants. 
  
Questions? 
  
Now is the time for questions.  Does anyone have any questions before we begin? 
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Instructions for the PP treatment with personal punishment 
Overview 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  Purdue University has provided funds for this 
research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, 
you can earn an appreciable amount of money. These earnings will be paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment.  
 We ask that you not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. Please turn 
off your cell-phones. Do not use e-mail. 
During the course of this experiment, you will be called upon to make decisions in 
several periods. The experiment is divided into five sequences of periods and each sequence is 
referred to as a cycle. 
• At the beginning of a cycle, each participant in this room will be randomly 
assigned to a set.  
 
• In each set there will be four persons.  
 
• For the whole duration of a cycle, you will interact exclusively with the three 
other participants in that set and nobody else.  
 
• You will never meet again these participants in the following cycles.  
 
In each period of a cycle: 
• In each period you will be matched to one other participant selected at random 
from the set you are assigned to. We will refer to this person as “your match.” 
 
• You will not be informed of the identity of your match. Hence, you do not know 
when you have already interacted with that person in previous periods of the 
same cycle. 
 
• You and your match will interact according to the rules described in the upper 
portion of your screen. The rules will be explained in a moment. 
 
• After each period you will be re-matched to a participant chosen at random from 
the set you are assigned to. There is one chance out of three that you will be 
matched with any given person in your set. 
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Interaction rules 
Each period is divided into two stages. In stage 1 you and your match can make either of 
two choices, Y or Z.  The points you earn depend upon both the choice you make and the choice 
made by your match in that period. As the payoff table on your screen (above) indicates, there 
are four possible outcomes for stage 1: 
1.   If both of you choose Y this period then:  you both earn 25 points. 
 
2.   If you choose Y this period and your match chooses Z then:  you earn 5 points and your 
match earns 30 points. 
 
3.   If you choose Z this period and your match chooses Y then: you earn 30 points and your 
match earns 5 points. 
 
4.    If you both choose Z then:  you both earn 10 points. 
Period 
History of choices of your 
previous matches 
You ignore the 
ID of your match 
 
Your set 
 8 
  To make your choice in stage 1, click the button next to either Y or Z.  You may change 
your mind at any time prior to clicking the “Submit” button by simply clicking on the button 
next to Y or Z. You are free to choose Y or Z in every period.  When you are satisfied with your 
choice, click the “Submit” button. After all persons have made their choices, the results of stage 
1 will appear on your screen (below).   
 
Before moving to another period, you have the opportunity to pay a cost to lower the 
earnings of your match (stage 2). You can click the button next to either NO or YES and then 
click submit when satisfied with your choice.  
If you choose NO, no points will be subtracted from the earnings of your match.  
If you choose YES, 5 points will be subtracted from your earnings and 10 points will be 
subtracted from the earnings of your match.  
After all persons have made their choices for stage 2, the final results of the period will appear 
on the lower portion of your screen (see screen below). Please notice that your period earnings 
can be negative. If your earnings in the period are negative, they will reduce your cumulative 
earnings. 
 9 
 
 
 
The result screen (above) will display the number of points you have earned for the 
period along with your choices and the choices of your match for both stage 1 and stage 2. The 
first column of the ‘Summary of Results’ table contains your past choices in stage 1. The second 
column concerns the choices in stage 1 of your previous matches. Notice that choices in the 
second column were most likely made by different persons in different periods. You are not 
given information on the choices made by the other two persons in your set. One of the 
columns lists the “Reduction received” in each period. It is marked “Yes” when your match 
requested to lower your earning and “No” otherwise. Please record your results for the period on 
your RECORD SHEET under the appropriate headings. 
 
At this stage a ball will be drawn from an urn containing one hundred balls numbered 
from 1 to 100. Each ball is equally likely to be selected. The computer program will randomly 
draw a ball and show the number on the result screen (above). If this random number is less than 
or equal to 95, then the cycle will continue into the next period. If this number is greater than 95, 
then the cycle ends.  Therefore, after each period there is a 95% chance that there will be 
another period of interactions in the cycle and a 5% chance that the cycle will end.   
Your results 
 
Random number 
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Suppose that a number less than or equal to 95 has been drawn.  Then you press the 
“Continue” button to proceed.  You will face the same decisional situation as in the previous 
period, but with a person selected at random from the set of participants you were assigned 
to. Remember that there are four participants in each set.  
 
Before making your choice, you may review all the outcomes in previous periods of the 
cycle by scrolling down the “Summary of Results” table.  The table shows your history and the 
past choices of the persons who happened to be your match in the period. You then choose either 
Y or Z in stage 1 and NO or YES in stage 2.  Your choice and the choices of your match this 
period are recorded and added to the Summary of Results table in the lower portion of your 
screen.  You record the outcome and your point earnings for the period.  
  
If the number drawn is greater than 95 then the cycle ends. When a cycle ends, you will 
be notified in a new screen. There will be a total of five cycles. The rules in the following cycles 
are the same as in the first, but you will interact with different persons. More precisely, after each 
cycle, new sets of persons will be formed. This assignment does not depend on actual choices. A 
participant will never interact with a person for more than one cycle. 
  
Earnings 
  
The points you earned in each period are added up. For every 10 points that you earn you will 
receive 13 cents ($.13).  Therefore, the more points you earn the more money you earn.  In 
addition, you will receive a $5 show-up fee. You will be paid your earnings in cash and in 
private at the end of today’s session. 
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Final Comments 
  
First, do not discuss your choices or your results with anyone at any time during the 
experiment.   
  
Second, your ID# is private.  Do not reveal it to anyone. 
  
Third, since there is a 95% chance that at the end of a period the cycle will continue, you 
can expect, on average, to interact for 20 periods in a given cycle.  However, since the stopping 
decision is made randomly, some cycles may be much longer than 20 periods and some others 
may be much shorter. 
  
Fourth, remember that after each period you will be matched randomly to someone in the 
set you were assigned to. As there are four people in the set, the probability of you being 
matched with the same person in two consecutive periods of a cycle is 1/3. You are not told the 
identity of your match. 
 
Fifth, the rules are the same in all five cycles. After a cycle, you will never meet again the 
same participants. 
  
Questions? 
  
Now is the time for questions.  Does anyone have any questions before we begin?  
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 QUIZ 
1. The total number of cycles is ________________ 
2. You are at the beginning of the cycle. How many periods do you expect the cycle will last, on 
average? _____________ 
3. You are in period 15 of the cycle. How many additional periods do you expect, on average? 
____________ 
4. The number of participants in the experiment (total in the room)  is________ 
5. In a given cycle with how many participants could you interact with  (i.e. number of people in 
a set)?  _________ 
6. In a given period with how many participants do you interact with?  __________ 
7. Other than your match, will you know at the end of the period the actions taken by people in 
your set? _________ 
8. Will you know at the end of the period the actions taken by participants outside your set? 
_________ 
9. Before choosing an action, will you know the ID of your match? _________ 
10. If  ID 5 is in your set this cycle, is there any chance that ID 5 will be your match in future 
cycles?  _________ 
11. How many points do you earn if both you and your match choose Y? _________ 
12. If the experiment lasts 100 periods and everybody always chooses Y, how many dollars are 
your going to earn? ___________________ 
13. How many points do you earn if you and your match choose Z? _________ 
14. If the experiment lasts 100 periods and everybody always chooses Z, how many dollars are 
your going to earn? ___________ 
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ID ____        DATE ______________ 
RECORD SHEET 
 
 
Cycle 
 
Period 
Stage 1 Stage 2  
Your 
earnings  
 
Cumulative 
earnings  Your choice 
(Y/Z) 
Choice of 
your  
match  
(Y/Z) 
Your 
choice 
(no/yes) 
Choice of 
your  
match  
(no/yes) 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
 
 
